Abstract-We consider a team of heterogeneous agents that is collectively responsible for servicing and subsequently reviewing a stream of homogeneous tasks. Each agent (autonomous system or human operator) has an associated mean service time and mean review time for servicing and reviewing the tasks, respectively, which are based on their expertise and skill-sets. Agents receive a utility based on the rates at which they service and review the tasks. The team objective is to collaboratively maximize the number of "serviced and reviewed" tasks. However, without appropriate incentives, collaborating with other teammembers is sub-optimal for each agent as it may reduce their own utility. To this end, we formulate a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game and design utility functions to incentivize collaboration among heterogeneous team-members in a decentralized manner. We show the existence and uniqueness of the Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) for the CPR game. We characterize the structure of the PNE and study the effect of heterogeneity among agents. In particular, we show that at PNE, the review rate of agents decreases with increasing ratio of mean review time and mean service time, i.e., the agents which are "better" in reviewing the tasks than servicing the tasks, review the tasks at higher review rates as compared to the agents which are "better" in servicing of tasks than reviewing them. We show that the CPR game is a best response potential game for which both sequential best response dynamics and simultaneous best reply dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we numerically illustrate the price of anarchy and other measures of inefficiency for the PNE.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As we become more connected around the globe, team collaboration becomes a necessity to produce results. Although modern workplaces endeavor to be social and collaborative affairs, most workplaces fail to solve the conundrum of achieving efficient collaboration among diverse, dynamic, digital and dispersed team members [2] .
An effective collaboration requires each team-member to efficiently work on their tasks while backing up other teammembers by monitoring and providing review and feedback [3] . Such team backup behavior improves team performance by mitigating the lack of certain skills in some team-members. Often times, lack of incentives to backup other members results in team-members operating individually This work has been supported by NSF Award IIS-1734272. A preliminary version of this work [1] will be presented at the 58th Conference on Decision and Control. We expand on our work in [1] by providing detailed proofs and introducing additional numerical illustrations. and a poor team performance. Therefore, for effective team performance, it is imperative to design appropriate incentives that facilitate collaboration among agents while In this paper, we study incentive design mechanisms to facilitate aforementioned team backup behavior among heterogeneous agents. In particular, we connect the class of problems involving humanteam-supervised autonomy with the CPR games [4] , [5] and design utilities that yield the desired behavior. Utilizing the framework of the CPR games allows us to incentivize team collaboration among heterogeneous agents in a decentralized manner, i.e., efficient social utility is achieved despite selfinterested actions of the individuals.
Human-team-supervised autonomy is a class of motivating problems for our setup. Queueing theory has emerged as a popular paradigm to study these problems [6] - [9] . However, these works predominantly consider a single human operator. There have been limited studies on human-team-supervised autonomy. These include simulation based studies [3] , [10] , [11] , ad hoc design [12] , or non-interacting operators [13] . Here, we focus on a game-theoretic approach to study one of the key features of the human-team-supervised autonomy: the team backup behavior, which refers to "the extent to which team-members help each other perform their roles" [3] .
Based on the hierarchical structure, organizations are often distinguished as either mechanistic (bureaucratic), or organic (professional) [14] . While mechanistic organizations are characterized by rigid hierarchy; high levels of formalization; and centralized decision making, organic organizations are flexible with weak or multiple hierarchies, and have low levels of formalization [15] . The flexibility in organic organizations leads to the decentralization of decision-making, and therefore, enables quick and easy reaction to changes in the environment. Hence, organic organizations cope best with the unpredictable and unstable environment that surrounds them, as compared to the mechanistic organizations which are appropriate in stable environments and for routine tasks and technologies. For organic organizations, which lack centralized authority for decision making, it is imperative to incentivize collaboration among heterogeneous team-members to achieve efficient team performance.
We model team backup behavior in the following way. We consider an unlimited supply of tasks from which each teammember may admit tasks for servicing at a constant rate. We assume that each serviced task is stored in a common review pool for a second review. Each team-member can choose to spend a fraction of their time to review tasks from the common review pool and provide the backup. In our setup, any agent can review tasks from the common review pool, independent arXiv:1908.03938v1 [math.OC] 11 Aug 2019 of whomsoever serviced the task. Therefore, any agent who serviced the tasks can also participate in the review process without impacting the quality of review process. This is sensible in scenarios in which, for example, review process involves performing a quality check using machines or verification through software. Without any incentives, members may not choose to review the tasks as it may affect their individual performance. We focus on design of incentives, within the CPR game formalism, to facilitate team backup behavior.
CPR games is a class of resource sharing games in which players jointly manage a common pool of resource and make strategic decisions to maximize their utilities. CPR games have been extensively used and experimentally tested by the economists. Some of the common games and experiments which have utilized CPR formulation include investment games [5] , [16] , [17] , request games [18] , [19] , as well as experiments for testing evolutionary theories [20] , [21] . Our formulation has features similar to the CPR game studied in [5] , [17] , [22] . In these works, authors utilize prospect theory to capture the risk aversion behavior of the players investing into a fragile CPR [16] that fails if there is excessive investment in the CPR. In case of the failure of common pool resource, no player receives any return from the CPR. While our design of the common review pool is similar to the fragile CPR, our failure model incorporates the constraint that only serviced tasks can be reviewed. In contrast to the agent heterogeneity due to prospect-theoretic risk preferences in [5] , heterogeneity in our model arises due to differences in agents' mean service and review times. Lastly, our game setup belongs to a class of request games in which each player request tokens from a common resource, and the resource fails if the total requested value is more than the realized value of the resource. Otherwise, each player is rewarded their requested amount of tokens, which determines the utility received by each player.
The major contributions of this work are fourfold. First, we present a novel formulation of team backup behavior and design incentives, within the CPR game formalism, to facilitate such behavior. Second, we show existence and uniqueness of the PNE for the proposed game. Third, we show that the proposed game is a best response potential game as defined in [23] , for which both sequential best response dynamics [24] and simultaneous best reply dynamics [25] converge to the PNE. Thus, the policies of self-interested agents in a decentralized team will converge to the PNE. Finally, we numerically illustrate the inefficiency of the PNE using Price of Anarchy (PoA) and show its variation as a function of a measure of heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. In Section II, we describe our problem, pose it as a CPR game and design utilities that facilitate team backup behavior. In Section III, we show the existence and uniqueness of the PNE for the proposed game. In Section IV, we show that the proposed game is an instance of a best response potential game for which best response dynamics converge to the Nash equilibrium. In Section V, we provide the structure of the social welfare solution. Numerical illustrations showing the effects of heterogeneity on Price of Anarchy are discussed in Section VI. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the problem setup and formulate the problem using a game-theoretic framework. We also present some preliminaries that will be used in the paper.
A. Problem Description
We consider a heterogeneous team of N ∈ N agents tasked with servicing a stream of homogeneous tasks. These agents could be autonomous systems or human operators. Each task after getting serviced by a team-member gets stored in a common review pool for a second review. This second review is a feedback process in which any team-member can reexamine the serviced task from the common review pool for performance monitoring and quality assurance purposes. Each agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N } may choose to spend a portion of her time to review the tasks from the common pool while spending her remaining time to service the incoming tasks. We consider heterogeneity among the operators due to the difference in their level of expertise and skill-sets in servicing and reviewing the tasks. This heterogeneity is captured by the average service time (µ
spent by operator i ∈ N on servicing and reviewing a task, respectively.
Let
] be the deterministic service and review admission rates, i.e., the rates at which agent i chooses to admit tasks for servicing and reviewing, respectively. We assume that each agent i can choose their admission rates independent of other agents. The range of λ 
where
) is the average time the agent spends on servicing (respectively, reviewing) the tasks within a unit time. Thus, if the agent has selected a review admission rate λ R i , then the service admission rate satisfies
We will assume that agents operate at their maximum capacity and equality holds in (1) . Fig. 1 shows the schematic of our problem setup. Notice that every task reviewed by the agents arrive from the common review pool of serviced tasks. Therefore, the total review admission rate, i.e., the rate at which tasks get reviewed from the common review pool, given by
, is upper bounded by the total arrival rate into the common review pool given by
(2) Fig. 1 : Player i devotes her time to service homogeneous tasks (at a constant service admission rate λ S i ) while reviewing serviced tasks from the common review pool (at a constant review admission rate λ R i ). The maximum admission rate for player i for servicing and reviewing the tasks is given by µ S i and µ R i , respectively.
Eq. (2) captures the constraint that only serviced tasks are available for review. By substituting (1) in (2), we obtain,
. Eq. (3) represents the system constraint on the review admission rate chosen by agents. We are interested in incentivizing the collaboration among agents for better team performance. Towards this end, we propose a game-theoretic setup defined below.
B. A Common-Pool Resource Game Formulation
We now formulate our problem in a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) game setup. Henceforth, we would refer to each agent as a player. A maximum service admission rate µ S i and a maximum review admission rate µ R i is associated with each player i, based on her skill-set and level of expertise. Without loss of generality, let players be ordered in the increasing order of the ratio of their maximum service admission rate to the maximum review admission rate, i.e.,
] be a non-empty convex and compact strategy set for each player i, from which the player chooses its admission rate for reviewing the tasks from the common review pool. Since we have assumed (1) holds with equality, once the player i decides her review admission rate λ R i ∈ S i , her service admission rate for servicing the tasks λ S i is given by the right hand side of (1). Let S = i∈N S i be the joint strategy space of all the players, where denotes the Cartesian product. Furthermore, we define S −i = j∈N ,j =i S j as the joint strategy space of all the players except player i.
For brevity of notation, we denote the total service admission rate and the total review admission rate by λ
denote the aggregated sum of the maximum service admission rates and maximum review admission rates of all the players, respectively.
Each player i receives a constant reward r S ∈ R >0 for servicing each task. Hence, the service utility u S i : S i → R >0 for player i servicing the tasks at the service admission rate λ S i is given by:
To incentivize collaboration among the agents, we design the review utility u R i : S → R >0 received for reviewing the tasks from the common review pool using two functions: a rate of return, r R : S → R >0 for each reviewed task and a probability of failure p :
be the slackness parameter for system constraint (3). The constraint (3) is violated for negative values of x. The slackness parameter characterizes the gap between total service admission rate and total review admission rate for all players. In order to maximize high quality team throughput, i.e., the number of tasks that are both serviced and reviewed, it is desired to incentivize the team to operate close to x = 0. We assume that the rate of return r R and the failure probability function p both depend on the strategy of all the players only through slackness parameter x. Furthermore, we assume that r R is strictly decreasing in x. Therefore, for each (3) is satisfied, and the rate of return is maximized at x = 0. The rate of return can be interpreted as the perks that the employer provides to all the employees for high quality service. For example, an employer generates higher revenue based on the high quality throughput of her company, i.e., based on number of "serviced and reviewed" tasks, which she redistributes among her employees as perks based on their contribution to the review process. Highest quality throughput is achieved by the company when the team efficiently reviews all the serviced tasks, i.e., when x = 0.
Since the system constraint (3) is a hard constraint that must be satisfied at all times, the failure probability function p = 1 if the system constraint (3) gets violated, i.e. slackness parameter x < 0. We assume that the failure probability p is non-increasing in x, and approaches 1 as x approaches 0. If the common review pool fails, then u R i = 0 for each player i. Therefore, we define the utility u
be the total utility of player i ∈ N . Each player i tries to maximize her expected utilitỹ
where the expectation is computed over the failure event. Since r R and p depend on review admission rate of all the players only through slackness parameter x, with a slight abuse of notation, we express r R (λ
, respectively. Substituting (1) in (6), we get:
where f i : S → R is defined by
The function f i is the incentive for player i to review the tasks. Note that player i will choose a non-zero λ (7) has a similar form to the one studied in [17] with some notable differences. In [17] , the heterogeneity of utility functions arises due to prospecttheoretic risk preferences among players, while in our setting it arises due to differences in player expertise and skill-sets. Furthermore, in [17] , each player has an identical strategy sets, S i = [0, 1] and the CPR fails if the total investment exceeds 1. Thus, at the maximum possible investment for each player, the CPR fails. However, in our setting, the CPR fails if the system constraint in (3) is violated, and the strategy set of each player S i = [0, µ R i ] may be non-identical. Here, no player may unilaterally enforce the failure of the CPR. Lastly, the structure of function f i , which we define as the incentive for player i, is different from [17] .
In the following, we will refer to the above CPR game by Γ = (N , {S i } i∈N , {ũ i } i∈N ). In this paper, we are interested in equilibrium strategies for players that are characterized by a PNE defined below.
be a best response of player i to the review admission rates of other players λ R −i . A PNE exists if and only if there exists an invariant strategy profile, λ R * = {λ
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF PNE
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of the PNE for the CPR game Γ with system constraint (3). Each player i ∈ N chooses a review admission rate from her strategy set S i = [0, µ R i ] and receives an expected utilitỹ u i given by (7) . For any given λ (3) is automatically satisfied, and for λ
We study the properties of game Γ under following assumptions. Recall that
we assume that the rate of return r R (λ R i , ·) for reviewing the tasks is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave for λ R i ∈ S i , with r R (0, 0) = 0. Equivalently, x → r R (x) is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and strictly concave for x ∈ [0, µ Fig. 2 for an illustration. Equivalently, p(x) is continuously differentiable, nonincreasing and convex for x ∈ (0, µ
, if no other player reviews any task, then each player i has a positive incentive to review tasks with maximum admission rate µ R i . Remark 1. The rate of return r R and the failure probability p can be easily designed to accommodate (A1-A3). Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the incentive function
is strictly concave in λ R i , which means for a fixed λ R −i , the player i has diminishing marginal incentive to review tasks. We make Assumption (A3) to provide positive incentives for players to review tasks with their maximum review admission rate µ R i , in the case when no other player chooses to review any task. We can design game Γ to satisfy Assumption (A3) by ensuring that the following conditions hold: 
, and c) for
If the latter condition holds, then x is large, and consequently, the failure probability p(µ
For most practical purposes, servicing a task requires more time than reviewing it, i.e., µ
If the total service admission rate of all the players except player i is much higher than the maximum review admission rate of player i, i.e. j∈N , j =i µ S j µ R i , for each i ∈ N , then condition (ii) holds. Notice that for a large team of agents where a single agent does not have much impact on the overall service rate, condition (ii) is true.
Theorem 1 (Existence of PNE). The CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), admits a PNE.
We prove Theorem 1 using Brouwer's fixed point theorem [27, Appendix C] applied to the best response mapping with the help of following lemmas (Lemma 2-4). Recall that
is the best response of player i to the review admission rates of other players λ R −i . For brevity of notation, we will represent r R (λ 
The first and the second partial derivative of incentive function f i with respect to λ
] is given by:
From Assumptions (A1) and (A2), we have f i < 0 and 
Proof. We prove the unique mapping of the best response through following three cases. 
Therefore, [28] ). Let there exist α i ∈ S i such that (10) ). Therefore, existence of α i satisfying (11) implies there exists a non-empty set
Hence, for λ R i ∈ S i , the expected utilityũ i is strictly concave with a unique global maximizer α i ∈ S i that satisfies
Case 3: There exists a non-empty intervalS i ⊂ S i , such that
Finally, consider the case that
11b) has no solution in the set S i and the expected utility of player i is strictly increasing in λ i , i.e., ∂ũi ∂λ R i > 0, for every λ R i ∈ S i . Therefore, the best response is the unique maximum ofũ i which occurs at the boundary µ R i .
We state some important intermediate results from three cases of Lemma 2 as a corollary for later discussions.
Corollary 1 (Best response and incentive). For the CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), the following statements hold:
, then the unique best response for player i satisfies the implicit equation
Proof. We only establish the first statement of the corollary. The other statements are established in the proof of Lemma 2. We have already established in Lemma 2 that if f i (λ R i , ·) ≤ 0, then for every λ R i ∈ S i , the expected utilityũ i is maximized for b i = 0. We now establish the "only if" part. Recall from (7) thatũ 
Lemma 3 (Continuity of best response mapping). For the CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), the best response
The mapping h represents an upper bound on the value of λ R i above which the system constraint (3) is violated and the resource fails with probability 1. Therefore, for each λ
where the latter follows from monotonicity of p (Assumption (A2)). The mapping h(λ R −i ) defined in (13) is continuous on S −i and linearly decreasing in λ R j , for every j ∈ N \ {i}. Therefore, to establish the continuity of the best response mapping b i (λ
To this end, we show that for each fixed value of h(λ R −i ), b i is unique and varies continuously with h.
The mappingλ + (λ R −i ), when non-zero, represents the maximal admissible review admission rate for player i, that yield her a positive incentive to review the tasks. Fig. 3 shows the best response of player i ∈ N for the three possible cases of λ + . 
, based on the value of λ R −i . In (a), f i < 0 and f i < 0 for all λ R i ∈ S i ; in (b), there exists a subset of S i where f i > 0 and f i < 0; and in c) f i ≥ 0 for any λ R −i . At h(λ R i ) (represented by blue), which is the upper bound on the value of λ R i above which the system constraint (3) is violated,
Case 2: h(λ
Hence, it follows from strict concavity of f i that its value decreases for any λ Since, b i <λ + , it follows that ifλ + → 0 + , then b i → 0 + . Hence, the continuity holds atλ + = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 1:
To prove the existence of a PNE, define a mapping M : S → S as follows:
(15) The mapping M is unique (Lemma 2) and continuous (Lemma 3), and maps the compact convex set S (S i is convex and compact, ∀i ∈ N ) to itself. Hence, application of Brouwer's fixed point theorem [27, Appendix C] yields that there exists a strategy profile λ R = {λ R i * } i∈N ∈ S which is invariant under the best response mapping and therefore is a PNE of the game.
Corollary 2 (PNE).
For the CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A3), the following statements hold for a PNE λ
and (ii) the review admission rate for player i at PNE is nonzero and satisfies the implicit equation
, µ In such a case, (11b) implies that the expected utility of each player with λ
at that PNE, and therefore, each of these players can improve their expected utility by unilaterally increasing their review admission rate. Therefore λ R * cannot be a PNE, which is a contradiction. Hence, f i (λ R * i , λ R * −i ) < 0 for any player i ∈ N at a PNE, and the corollary follows.
Proposition 1 (Structure of PNE). For the CPR game Γ with players ordered in increasing order of
Proof of Proposition 1. Let λ R * k1 and λ R * k2 be the review admission rates at a PNE for players k 1 and k 2 , respectively,
. We assume λ R * k1 < λ R * k2 and prove the first statement by establishing a contradiction argument using two cases discussed below. Furthermore, the proof of the second statement is contained within Case 1 below.
From (8), the incentives f k1 and f k2 for players k 1 and k 2 at a PNE satisfies:
Therefore, utilizing statement (i) of Corollary 2 again implies λ R * k2 = 0, which is a contradiction. This case also proves the second statement.
respectively.
We assume that λ
, and therefore, λ
. Using (8) and (9a), we get
which is a contradiction. Hence, if λ
It follows from Proposition 1 that the review admission rate of a player i at a PNE is monotonically decreasing with the ratio
. Therefore, at a PNE, as the heterogeneity among the players become very large, players with small (respectively, large) ratio of
review the tasks with high (respectively, zero) review admission rate. We will show in Lemma 5 that the PNE shares these characteristics with the social welfare solution. We illustrate this further in Section VI.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness of PNE). The PNE admitted by the CPR game Γ, under assumptions (A1-A3), is unique.
Proof. Suppose that the CPR game Γ has multiple PNEs. We define the support of a PNE as the total number of players with non-zero review admission rate. Let
i be the slackness parameter at PNE 1 and PNE 2 , respectively.
We prove the uniqueness of PNE using a six step process.
Step 1: We first show that if there exists two unique PNEs with distinct supports m 1 and m 2 (m 1 < m 2 ), then x 1 < x 2 . Recall that the review admission rate is monotonically decreasing with 
Step 2: We now show that x 1 > x 2 using Steps 2-6, which is a contradiction to the result of Step 1, and consequently
From statement (ii) of Corollary 2, the review admission rate of any player i, i ≤ m 1 , at PNE k , k ∈ {1, 2}, satisfies
Step 3: We show that f (8), the incentives f i and f j for any two distinct players i and j with j > i at a PNE k , k ∈ {1, 2} satisfies:
Notice that the right hand side of above equation is independent of λ R i and therefore, a constant for both PNEs. Consequently, f
Step 4: We show that f
Recall that f i is strictly concave in x (Lemma 1). Therefore,
Step 1) implies
Step 5: We now show that x 1 > x 2 , which is a contradiction to result of Step 1, and consequently m 1 = m 2 .
Since for all players i, i ≤ m 1 , f
, which is a contradiction to result of Step 1. Hence, m 1 = m 2
Step 6: We now show the value of slackness parameter x at any PNE is unique.
Steps 1 to 5 show that, at a PNE, the number of players with non-zero review admission rate are unique. Therefore, let m be the identical support for PNE 1 and PNE 1 . Without loss of generality, let
Let g i : R → R, for i ≤ m, be defined by
Differentiating g i (x) w.r.t x, we get
Recall from statement (ii) of Corollary 2 that players have non-zero review admission rate at PNE, if and only if, f i > 0 at PNE. Strict concavity of f i (Lemma 1) implies ∂gi(x) ∂x > 0. Consequently, at PNE, the review admission rate for any player i, i ≤ m, is increasing with x. Therefore, assumption
, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x 1 = x 2 .
Step 7: We now show the uniqueness of PNE.
Steps 1 to 6 show that, at a PNE, the number of players with non-zero review admission rate and the slackness parameter x are unique. Therefore, the first order conditions (16) give the unique review admission rate for each player i for unique slack parameter x, thereby implying uniqueness of PNE.
IV. CONVERGENCE TO THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We now show that the proposed CPR game Γ under Assumptions (A1-A3) belong to the class of Quasi Aggregative games as defined below.
Definition 2 (Quasi Aggregative game). Consider a set of players N , where each player i ∈ N has a strategy set S i , and a utility function u i . Let S = i∈N S i be the joint strategy space of all the players, and S −i = j∈N ,j =i S j be the joint strategy space of all the players except player i. A game Γ = (N , {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N ) is a quasi-aggregative game with aggregator g : S → R, if there exists continuous functions F i : R × S i → R (the shift functions) and σ i : S −i → X −i ⊆ R, i ∈ N (the interaction functions) such that the utility functions u i for each player i ∈ N can be written as:
An alternative, but less general way of defining a quasiaggregative game replaces (17) in the definition with:
where u i : X × S i → R, and X = {g(s) |s ∈ S} ⊆ R.
For the CPR game Γ, let σ i (λ
be the interaction functions and shift functions, respectively. The expected utilityũ i , which is defined in (7), can be re-written in the formũ
Hence, the CPR game Γ is a quasi-aggregative game.
Specializing [30, Theorem 1] to the CPR game Γ, we obtain that if the best response for all the players is decreasing in the interaction function σ i (λ
, the CPR game Γ is a best response pseudo-potential game [31] . We now establish that the best response for each player is monotonically decreasing in σ i .
Lemma 4 (Decreasing best response). For the CPR game Γ, under Assumptions (A1-A2), the best response mapping
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering the three cases of best response mapping in Lemma 2: 
. In this case, from statement (ii) of Corollary 1, b i ∈ S i such that f i > 0 and f i < 0 for every λ
Hence, b i is strictly decreasing in σ i (λ
Furthermore, Remark 1 in [24] states that a best response pseudo-potential game with a unique best response is an instance of best response potential game [23] . Therefore, the CPR game Γ, with its unique (Lemma 2) and monotonically decreasing best response b i in σ i (λ R −i ) (Lemma 4), is a best response potential game. Hence, simple best response dynamics such as sequential best response dynamics [24] and simultaneous best response dynamics [25] converge to its unique PNE.
V. SOCIAL WELFARE
Social welfare corresponds to the optimal (centralized) allocation by players with respect to a social welfare function. We choose a typical social welfare function Ψ(λ R ) : S → R defined by the sum of expected utility of all players, i.e.,
A social welfare solution is an optimal allocation that maximizes the social welfare function. , the associated social welfare solution, λ R ∈ S is given by:
where k is the smallest index such that
, a bisection algorithm can be employed to compute optimal c and hence, the optimal social welfare solution.
Proof. Under the constraint ) to operate at their highest review admission rate, where the value of k is selected such that
Finally, the k-th player in the ordered sequence is selected to operate at a review admission rate such that the constraint
= c is satisfied. Therefore, the social welfare solution is of the form,
Furthermore, for the function r R (x) and p(x) satisfying Assumptions (A1-A2), Ψ is strictly concave in x, i.e.,
With the known form of the social welfare solution, the value of c, which corresponds to the unique maximizer x (therefore, unique
dx 2 < 0) can be computed efficiently by employing a bisection algorithm.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we present numerical examples illustrating the uniqueness of PNE and the variation of inefficiency with increasing heterogeneity among the players. We consider three measures of inefficiency for PNE which include a) Price of Anarchy (PoA) [32] , b) Ratio of total review admission rate, and c) Ratio of Latency, which are described by
respectively. In our numerical illustrations, we obtain the PNE by simulating the sequential best response dynamics of players with randomized initialization of their strategy. We verify the uniqueness of the PNE for different choices of functions, r R (x) and p(x) satisfying Assumptions (A1-A2), and by following sequential best response dynamics with multiple random initialization for strategy of each player. Furthermore, in our numerical simulations, we relax the Assumption (A3) and still obtain a unique PNE.
An example illustration is shown in Fig. 4 , where we show the social welfare solution (obtained using fmincon in MAT-LAB) and PNE for low and high heterogeneity among players, respectively. For our numerical illustrations, we choose the number of players, N = 6, and choose the functions r R (x) and p(x), satisfying Assumptions (A1-A2) as following: To characterize the heterogeneity among the players, we do a random sampling of the player's maximum service admission rate and maximum review admission rate from normal distributions with fixed means, M µ S ∈ R >0 , and M µ R ∈ R >0 , and identical standard deviation, ρ ∈ R >0 . Any non-positive realizations were discarded. We consider the standard deviation of the distributions as the measure of heterogeneity among the players. Fig. 4 shows that in the social welfare solution, players with low ratio of drop out of the game. At PNE, the strategy profile of players follow the characteristics described by Proposition 1. Lastly, with the increase in heterogeneity among the players, the PNE starts to approach the social welfare solution. Fig. 5 shows the variation of different measures of inefficiency for PNE with increasing heterogeneity among the players. Fig. 5a shows the plot of POA with increasing heterogeneity. In case of homogeneous players, i.e., ρ = 0, any strategy profile, produces same value of social welfare function, Ψ (see (22) ), and hence results in PoA = 1. As we initially increase the heterogeneity among the players, PNE starts to deviate from the social welfare solution, resulting in increase in PoA. Finally, with large increase in heterogeneity among the players, PNE starts to approach the social welfare solution, i.e. players with small ratio of starts to drop out of the game (see Proposition 1). We note that PoA ≤ 1.15, suggesting that the unique PNE is close to the optimal centralized social welfare solution. Fig. 5b and 5c shows other relevant measures of inefficiency for our problem. Since incentivizing team collaboration is of interest, the ratio of total review admission rate for the social welfare and PNE solution, i.e. η T RI = (λ R T ) SW (λ R T ) P N E
, forms an ideal measure of inefficiency for PNE. Other relevant measure of inefficiency based on latency (inverse of throughput) is given by η LI =
. It is evident from Fig. 5 , that all measure of inefficiency are close to 1 and therefore suggesting near-optimal PNE solution. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We studied incentive design mechanisms to facilitate effective team collaboration among the agents servicing a stream of homogeneous tasks. In particular, we designed a CommonPool Resource (CPR) game to incentivize team collaboration and showed the existence and uniqueness of PNE. We showed that the proposed CPR game is an instance of the best response potential game and by playing the sequential best response against each other, players converge to the unique PNE. At PNE, the review admission rate of players decreases with the increasing ratio of µ S i µ R i , i.e., review admission rate is higher for the players that are "better" at reviewing the tasks than servicing the tasks (characterized by their average service and review time).
There are several possible avenues of future research. It is of interest to extend the results for a broader class of games with less restrictive choice of utility functions, i.e. games that are not quasi-aggregative or commonly used games of weak strategic substitutes (WSTS) or complements (WSTC). An interesting open problem is to consider a team of agents processing stream of heterogeneous tasks. In such a setting, incentivizing team collaboration based on the task-dependent skill-set of the agents is also of interest.
